Futenma (Japan) negative *****ALL PURPOSE LINK BOOSTER*****2 Link booster3 *****AT: ALLIANCE COLLAPSE *****4 1NC FRONTLINE – NO ALLIANCE COLLAPSE5-6 No Alliance Collapse – 2NC/1NR Ext #1/2 : China Threat7 No Alliance Collapse – Ext: Threats8 No Alliance Collapse – AT: Disagreements9 No Alliance Collapse – AT: Disagreements (Nye)10 *****AT:JAPANESE NUCLEAR PROLIF****11 No Prolif12-13 *****AT: DPJ*****14 Economic Reforms Fail15-18 *****AT: DUGONG*****19 Species Defense20 *****DISADVANTAGE LINKS*****21 Heg DA Links22 *****COUNTERPLANS*****23 Public Diplomacy CP24 Consult Japan25 *****ALL PURPOSE LINK BOOSTER***** Link booster
Closing Futemna and stopping new base construction would catalyze anti-US military movements in Okinawa, leading to total US withdrawal. Feffer 10 (John Feffer 3-6-10 the co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies “Okinawa and the new domino effect” http://www. atimes. com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh02. html Wherever the US military puts down its foot overseas, movements have sprung up to protest the military, social, and environmental consequences of its military bases. This anti-base movement has notched some successes, such as the shut-down of a US navy facility in Vieques, Puerto Rico, in 2003.
In the Pacific, too, the movement has made its mark. On the heels of the eruption of Mt Pinatubo, democracy activists in the Philippines successfully closed down the ash-covered Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station in 1991-1992. Later, South Korean activists managed to win closure of the huge Yongsan facility in downtown Seoul. Of course, these were only partial victories. Washington subsequently negotiated a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines, whereby the US military has redeployed troops and equipment to the island, and replaced Korea’s Yongsan base with a new one in nearby Pyeongtaek.
But these not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) victories were significant enough to help edge the Pentagon toward the adoption of a military doctrine that emphasizes mobility over position. The US military now relies on “strategic flexibility” and “rapid response” both to counter unexpected threats and to deal with allied fickleness. The Hatoyama government may indeed learn to say no to Washington over the Okinawa bases. Evidently considering this a likelihood, former deputy secretary of state and former US ambassador to Japan Richard Armitage has said that the United States “had better have a plan B”.
But the victory for the anti-base movement will still be only partial. US forces will remain in Japan, and especially Okinawa, and Tokyo will undoubtedly continue to pay for their maintenance. Buoyed by even this partial victory, however, NIMBY movements are likely to grow in Japan and across the region, focusing on other Okinawa bases, bases on the Japanese mainland, and elsewhere in the Pacific, including Guam. Indeed, protests are already building in Guam against the projected expansion of Andersen Air Force Base and Naval Base Guam to accommodate those Marines from Okinawa. And this strikes terror in the hearts of Pentagon planners.
In World War II, the United States employed an island-hopping strategy to move ever closer to the Japanese mainland. Okinawa was the last island and last major battle of that campaign, and more people died during the fighting there than in the subsequent atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined: 12,000 US troops, more than 100,000 Japanese soldiers, and perhaps 100,000 Okinawan civilians. This historical experience has stiffened the pacifist resolve of Okinawans. The current battle over Okinawa again pits the United States against Japan, again with the Okinawans as victims.
But there is a good chance that the Okinawans, like the Na’vi in that great NIMBY film Avatar, will win this time. A victory in closing Futenma and preventing the construction of a new base might be the first step in a potential reverse island hop. NIMBY movements may someday finally push the US military out of Japan and off Okinawa. It’s not likely to be a smooth process, nor is it likely to happen any time soon. But the kanji (a form of Japanese writing) is on the wall. Even if the Yankees don’t know what the Japanese characters mean, they can at least tell in which direction the exit arrow is pointing. ****AT: ALLIANCE COLLAPSE ***** 1NC FRONTLINE – NO ALLIANCE COLLAPSE 1. No alliance collapse – Chinese threat will always trump disagreements New Straits Times 09(November 19, http://www. koreatimes. co. kr/www/news/opinon/2010/05/171_55695. html) But political suspicions between Japan and China are a fact of life and, given Japanese apprehension of China’s intentions as it grows not only economically but also militarily, Tokyo is unlikely to want to weaken its security relationship with Washington. Moreover, the US under the Obama administration is keen to make up for lost time and bolster its influence in East Asia.
That being the case, the Japan-US relationship is likely to remain strong for as long as China remains viewed as a potential threat by Japan and other countries in East Asia. 2. Zero chance Japan breaks the alliance or goes nuclear – too many security threats and economic interests Glosserman 09 (Brad – executive director of Pacific Forum CSIS, Korea Herald, Novermber 20, 2009, www. ifpa. org/pdf/RealignPriorities. pdf) Ultimately, I don’t worry about the future of the U. S. -Japan alliance because Japan doesn’t have many viable security alternatives.
Northeast Asia is a dangerous neighborhood. Japan’s economy is reliant on trade and long, exposed sea lanes. While new and nontraditional security challenges are rising in significance, traditional state threats endure. North Korean rhetoric continues to be vitriolic and targets Japan. Relations with China have warmed, but they continue to be fraught. Japanese insecurities are magnified by China’s rise and its growing confidence. There is a long list of issues that complicate that bilateral relationship and they will not be fixed by a change of government in Tokyo.
Of course, Japan – like all other countries – has to engage China, but trust in China is a precious commodity – and it seems to be dwindling. This enduring suspicion is a powerful obstacle to the establishment of a new Japanese foreign policy. It has to be overcome if Asian nations are to build an Asian community. And, as in Europe, it will be overcome. But it will not go away. The U. S. -Japan alliance will provide Tokyo the sense of security that it needs to engage China and build that community. In theory, there is another Japanese option: an independent, self-reliant defense posture, which is usually code for going nuclear.
That will not happen. Japanese strategists understand that the nuclear option does not serve their country’s national interest. The public remains allergic to nuclear weapons. Japan would only go nuclear as a last resort, as an act of desperation if the alliance with the U. S. were to dissolve. And Tokyo knows well that going nuclear would end its alliance. Thus, for reasons positive and negative, alliance with the U. S. makes the most sense for Japan. That does not mean that the alliance is perfect as is. It must be modernized and adapted to new realities, within Japan, the U. S. and in the region.
That process is underway. It has been and will continue to be messy. But the fundamental interests of Japan and the U. S. remain aligned. The alliance continues to serve both well, as President Obama’s recent visit makes clear. It will endure. 3. Public Japanese support for the alliance is strong, preventing collapse Hughes 09 (Christopher Hughes, Prof. , International Politics, U. of Warwick, UK, JAPANS REMILITARIZATION, 2009, 134) Japanese support for the US alliance has grown since the 1980s, with those viewing it as functioning effectively for Japan’s security rising to a high of 75% by 2006.
Public approval of a combination of the JSDF and the US–Japan security treaty as the best means to ensure national security has risen, from 40% in the 1970s to close to 80% in 2006. 1NC FRONTLINE – NO ALLIANCE COLLAPSE 4. New agreement and new Japanese leadership solves – the Alliance is back on safe footing Denmark and Kliman 2010 (Abraham M. Denmark is a Fellow at CNAS. Dr. Daniel M. Kliman is a Visiting Fellow at CNAS. “Cornerstone: A Future Agenda for the U. S. -Japan Alliance” Center for New American Security June) The election of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) on August 30, 2009 inaugurated a new phase in the U.
S. -Japan alliance. After coming to power, the DPJ embarked on a foreign policy emphasizing Japan’s relations with East Asia and calling for a “more equal” alliance with the United States. Although this rhetoric unnerved some in Washington, what most troubled the alliance was the DPJ’s attempt to fulfill a campaign pledge by renegotiating a 2006 agreement with the United States that called for closing Futenma, a U. S. Marine base in Okinawa, and building a new runway in the waters off Camp Schwab – another U. S. Marine base on the island. The U. S. overnment initially resisted the DPJ’s bid to reopen negotiations over Futenma, arguing that an agreement was already in place and revisions would jeopardize the entire effort to transfer U. S. forces out of Japan to reduce the basing footprint there. 1 Frustration mounted in Washington and Tokyo, and some observers voiced concerns about an alliance adrift. 2 The United States and Japan remained at odds over Futenma for nine months until a combination of intensive U. S. diplomacy and growing disenchantment in Japan with then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s handling of the alliance finally broke the impasse.
The new agreement, issued in May 2010 via a joint statement that reaffirmed the 2006 accord, clearly weakened Hatoyama. With his support in freefall, his governing coalition in revolt, and elections for Japan’s Upper House scheduled in July 2010, Hatoyama resigned shortly thereafter. Although the new agreement will likely face consid- erable resistance from vocal opposition groups in Okinawa, it nonetheless removes a major roadblock to advancing the alliance on other fronts. The agreement on Futenma coupled with Hatoyama’s resignation heralded the end of a tur- bulent period.
An alliance agenda once consumed by Futenma is now open to more productive pur- suits. And in newly chosen Prime Minister Naoto Kan, Washington has a new partner in Tokyo who does not carry the baggage of Hatoyama’s approach to Futenma, is more experienced, and, by many accounts, operates more pragmatically than his predecessor. 3 Thus, the 50th anniversary of the alliance’s founding, until recently considered a squandered opportunity, can still serve as a spring- board for adapting the alliance for the political and strategic challenges of the 21st century.
No Alliance Collapse – 2NC/1NR Ext #1/2 : China Threat China threat will always outweigh and prevent alliance collapse – that’s 1NC 1 and 2, New Straits Times and Glosserman ’09. Japan isn’t stupid and the perceived threat of China’s military and economic rise and other Asian challengers will overwhelm disagreements between Japan and the US. Multiple key warrants: 1. Obama is keen to keep the alliance strong – he’ll do the work to preserve it 2. Japanese apprehension toward China is a fact of life and won’t go away 3. Japan lacks viable security alternative to the alliance 4.
Fundamental security interests will overwhelm any frictions Three reasons to prefer our arguments: 1. Context – they take the entire context of the relationship into account 2. Most qualified – Glosserman’s the executive director of the Pacific Forum at the CSIS 3. Consensus – the overwhelming majority of experts and government officials agree that fear of China will keep the alliance in place Tisdall 3/8/10 (Simon, assist. Editor and foreign affairs columnist, “china threat can heal us-japan rift” The Guardian UK, http://www. guardian. co. uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/08/china-us-alliance-under-pressure)
The Okinawa dispute reflects broader differences. Hatoyama’s view that Japan needs a more “balanced” relationship with Washington after 65 years of polite subservience in the security sphere, and his related interest in developing an EEC-style east Asian economic community including China, have produced sharply critical reactions in Washington. “The relationship between the US and Japan is in its worst state ever,” said Hisahiko Okazaki, a former ambassador, in the daily newspaper Sankei Shimbun. “The Japan-US alliance is too valuable an asset to lose,” he wrote.
Despite such dramatic huffing and puffing, the bottom-line reality, say senior foreign ministry officials, former and serving ministers, and leading commentators, is there is not the remotest chance that the security alliance will be “lost”. It may be adapted or modified. It may evolve. And for its part, says former deputy foreign minister Hitoshi Tanaka, Japan “needs to think seriously about how it can better contribute to international security” and “to consider if it is still right to stick to the existing interpretation of the constitutional prohibition on the use of force”.
But the official consensus is firm that the US relationship will continue to form the “cornerstone” of Japan’s defences, as foreign minister Katsuya Okada put it – a position shared by Hatoyama. The main reason behind this confidence that, despite all the stresses and strains, the alliance will endure is not hard to discern: growing mutual fear of China. No Alliance Collapse – Ext: Threats Security needs trump Japanese resentment of the US military presence – the Alliance isn’t breaking Nina Hachigian, (Sr. Vice President, Center for American Progress & Former Analyst, RAND Corp. ), THE NEXT AMERICAN CENTURY, 2008, 145.
Unlike the others, Japan is hanging on to the U. S. alliance for dear life. The Japanese are no longer worried, as they were in the 1980s, that the U. S. will try to keep them down (though they still resent it). There is a broad consensus in Japan that no strategic option is more attractive or viable than sticking to the U. S. like glue. With a growing China and a nuclear North Korea on their doorstep, Japan needs to keep America close. Disputes won’t hurt the alliance – security threats overwhelm Muthiah Alagappa, (Sr. Fellow, East-West Center), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 58.
Except for a brief period in the early 1990s, Tokyo has all along viewed the security treaty with the United States as the cornerstone of its security policy. Growing concern about a rising and nationalist China, as well as North Korea, has renewed emphasis on the U. S. -Japan security treaty. Despite Japanese concerns of entrapment and a desire for greater autonomy, the U. S. -Japan security treaty is likely to endure and become more equal. No Alliance Collapse – AT: Disagreements Alliance will never collapse – in spite of disputes, common interests overwhelm Faleomavaega 09 (Eni H. US Rep from Delaware, “Japan’s Changing Role,” Congressional Hearing, June 25, http://findarticles. com/p/news-articles/political-transcript-wire/mi_8167/is_20090629/del-eni-faleomavaega-holds-hearing/ai_n50893710/pg_4/) In conclusion, it’s important that the U. S. and Japan, the world’s two largest economies, not turn inward in a time of crisis. Even though domestic political realignment in Japan may cause a period of minor frictions in the traditional security agenda, our common interest is overwhelming and the alliance is likely to prosper unless we handle things very poorly. No Alliance Collapse – AT: Disagreements (Nye)
Mutual security interests overwhelm political disputes Nye 09 (Joseph Nye, Harvard JFK School, June 25 2009, DEL. ENI H. FALEOMAVAEGA HOLDS A HEARING ON JAPAN’S CHANGING ROLE, Political Transcript Wire, June 29, 2009 p lexis) Subsequently, as Bill Emmett has pointed out in his recent book, “The Rivals”, if you look at the rise of Asia, not just as the rise of China, but also the rise of India, you’ll find that there is balance within Asia. And the important thing for us is not to contain China or to treat China as an enemy, but to hedge against the possibility that at some time in the future, we would face, what you describe.
And, that policy, as Mike Green said, has worked on a bipartisan basis. It has good bipartisan support. And, I think it is the right policy. It gives us the best options for a better future. And, it also is good for Japan. Because Japan, if we have a problem of thinking about the rise of Chinese power, Japan has it immediately, it’s right next door. And, that’s why, I think, the U. S-Japan alliance, despite the frictions that are bound to occur as we see this political change that my colleagues have then described, I think that is not oing to threaten the alliance, because it’s so strongly in the interest of both Japan and the United States. So, this is why I concluded my testimony by saying, I’m relatively optimistic. Not just about the U. S. -Japan alliance, but about the potential for a stable east Asia, if we play our cards right. *****AT:JAPANESE NUCLEAR PROLIF**** No Prolif DPJ won’t nuclearize, even if they rearm Fukuyama 8/25/09(Shingo, secretary general of the Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikin). Hiromichi Umebayashi is special adviser to Peace Depot, a nonprofit organization. The Japan Times, http://search. japantimes. co. jp/cgi-bin/eo20090825a1. html In fact, there are signs of greater flexibility than these people acknowledge. It is widely predicted that there will be a change of government after the Aug. 30 elections and that the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), currently the largest opposition party, will win. The attitude to NFU by the DPJ and its potential coalition partners is likely to be quite different from the LDP. DPJ secretary general Katsuya Okada has suggested that Japan work with Washington to achieve a NFU policy.
In response to a questionnaire sent recently to Japanese political parties by disarmament nongovernment organizations, the DPJ said that NFU was an issue that should be discussed with the U. S. government. The Social Democratic Party, a potential coalition party in a new government, and the Japanese Communist Party also supported an NFU policy. Even New Komeito, which is a member of the current government, supported an NFU policy if there is an international consensus. Opposition to NFU within the LDP is by no means universal.
So the picture of monolithic Japanese opposition to NFU, presented by some U. S. commentators, is really quite misleading. As for the argument that Japan will go nuclear if Washington reduces the number and missions of U. S. nuclear forces, this is nonsense. Japanese political leaders are intelligent enough to know that going nuclear would have huge ramifications that would not be in Japan’s national interest. No political party in Japan supports acquiring nuclear weapons. Sixty-four years after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the anti- nuclear sentiment in Japan remains strong.
Over 1,400 local authorities (about 80 percent) have made nuclear-free pledges. These local authorities represent the spirit of nuclear abolition in Japanese society far better than the LDP-led central government. If the Obama administration moves decisively to get rid of “the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. ” the joy of the vast majority of the Japanese people will overwhelm the reservations of an unrepresentative clique in the Japanese bureaucratic system. So, Mr. Obama, act boldly. Grasp the opportunity that is before you. Japan is ready. No Prolif
Japan will never proliferate – would crush their economy, public would backlash, and they’re not stupid Takubo 09(Masa, Independent analyst on nuclear issues living in Japan and operator of the nuclear information Web site Kakujoho, article is based in part on a chapter on Japan’s attitudes toward nuclear disarmament in a forthcoming report by the International Panel on Fissile Materials. November, http://www. armscontrol. org/act/2009_11/Takubo) Furthermore, a Japanese nuclear-weapon program could in fact jeopardize Japan’s security arrangement with the United States and its position in the international community.
Former Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba, who is known for his knowledge of nuclear and military affairs, recently said about Japan exercising the option to develop nuclear weapons, “That would naturally mean Japan withdrawing from the NPT. We would not be able to obtain nuclear fuel…. With dependency on nuclear power for about 40% of [our] electricity, we would experience a major decline in economic activities. Japan going nuclear would automatically mean the collapse of the NPT regime and there would be nuclear countries all around us.  In a book published three years ago, Ishiba said, “In any case, the voters would not allow such a thing as possession of nuclear weapons. Japan would have to consider these realities before going nuclear, which so-called realists in the United States tend to ignore. Ishiba, a conservative, knows about these realities. If the United States adopts a sole purpose policy, can one really argue that Japan would believe that whatever benefits it might gain from going nuclear would outweigh the negative consequences?
The DPJ, which won a landslide victory in Japan’s August 30 election, declared its nuclear policy supporting no-first-use in 2000. Okada was the head of the team that developed this policy. Although the current official status of the document is not clear, on May 12, 2009, Okada, who was DPJ secretary-general at the time, told a Diet session that “a norm not allowing at least first use, or making it illegal to use nuclear weapons against countries not possessing nuclear weapons, should be established. Japan should be at the forefront of this effort as a leader. In an interview soon after, Okada elaborated on his position: I believe that Japan should advocate the following three points: that the states possessing nuclear weapons, the United States in particular, should declare no first use; formation of an agreement that it is illegal to use nuclear weapons against countries without nuclear weapons; and, partly overlapping with these two, the initiative of a Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. If the United States declares no first use, that does not mean that Japan will be completely outside the nuclear umbrella.
In a situation where nuclear weapons actually exist in this world, it would be natural that people feel worried about the nuclear umbrella going away. I talk about going out of the nuclear umbrella halfway, where first use would not be exercised, but in the unfortunate case that Japan suffers a nuclear attack, we are not ruling out a nuclear response to it. We have such an assurance ultimately. So please understand that I am not just talking about an idealistic theory.  He said, however, that “[w]e do not necessarily need a nuclear umbrella against the nuclear threat of North Korea. I think conventional weapons are enough to deal with it.
At the recent Tokyo meeting, Perry said that the combined conventional forces of Japan and the United States would be enough to deter nuclear attacks of North Korea and that those forces could cause devastating damage. North Korea’s leaders know that, and they are not suicidal, he said Okada repeated his position in the inaugural Cabinet press conference on September 16, saying, “My own personal belief has been to question whether countries which declare their willingness to make first use of nuclear weapons have any right to speak about nuclear disarmament, or nuclear nonproliferation, in particular nonproliferation. ” ****AT: DPJ***** Economic Reforms Fail Kan’s plans for economic reform are extremely vague and lacks crucial details Rowley 6-23 (Anthony, Correspondent for the Business Times, “Kan’s new economic plan lacks detail”, 6-23-2010, http://www. businesstimes. com. sg/sub/views/story/0,4574,391690,00. html, 6-23-2010) TC Like an upscale restaurant menu that carries no prices (because if you need to ask you can’t afford to dine there), the Japanese government’s 10-year economic ‘growth strategy’ published last week offers a huge variety of policy ‘dishes’ – more than 300 in fact – without deigning to put a price on any of them.
Changing scene: The emphasis in the final version of Japan’s growth strategy is on plans to promote seven ‘strategic sectors’ in highly uncontroversial areas such as the environment and energy, health and medical care, tourism and local revitalisation, employment creation, human resource development and ‘co-prosperity with Asia’ This is partly because the Democratic Party of Japan-led government has yet to decide how to finance a huge programme of reforms that are supposed to lift the world’s second largest economy out of the doldrums of deflation and stagnation that have condemned it to relative decline in recent decades.
It is also probably because the idea of providing policy supports to officially-targeted strategic industries in Japan is likely to prove controversial, especially at a time when Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s new government is adopting a hair-shirt image of fiscal austerity. Radical ideas – such as that of Japan emulating its competitors by subsidising the development of strategic industries – that appeared in source material for the growth strategy, are bsent from the final plan (at least in the English translation) apparently for fear of stirring controversy abroad. As a result, the growth strategy appears to have metamorphosed from a hard-edged method for making government an active partner of Japanese industry – a new ‘Japan Inc’ philosophy – into a traditional, rather ‘fuzzy’ Japanese plan that appears designed neither to please nor offend anyone. The lack of boldness that characterises Japan’s new growth strategy may be a political feint on Mr Kan’s part.
When Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Meti) produced its own ‘vision’ of Japan’s industrial future a few weeks ago, much of which was supposed to find its way into the growth strategy, there was talk of restoring Japan’s position as a leading manufacturing nation. Areas such as space and aerospace development, robotics, advanced electronics and information technology were supposed to become central to Japan’s future industrial strategy, to offset its dangerous over-dependence on a few consumer manufactures such as motor vehicles and consumer electronics.
Meti lamented the loss of Japan’s position as Asia’s leading industrial nation and its dramatic decline in competitiveness and its plunge in per capita GDP status. It called for Japan to emulate the ‘proactive’ industrial policies of nations such as the US, South Korea and France by providing subsidies and other supports for the development of key industries. All this appears to have been downplayed, if not actually dropped, from the final version of the growth strategy which Mr Kan will use as a basis for the manifesto that his party will present to voters in the upper house parliamentary election due next month.
Instead, the emphasis is on plans to promote seven ‘strategic sectors’ in highly uncontroversial areas such as the environment and energy, health and medical care, tourism and local revitalisation, employment creation, human resource development and ‘co-prosperity with Asia’. Only the idea of turning Japan into a more ‘science and technology-oriented nation’ and the inclusion (as a kind of after-thought) of financial sector development hint at a more hard-nosed attempt to push Japan back into the forefront of industrial innovation and regional leadership.
Through promotion of these activities, Japan is supposed to raise its average annual real growth rate from around one per cent over the past couple of decades (with much of that due to the boosting effect that deflation has on ‘real’ GDP) to 3 per cent in nominal terms and 2 per cent in real terms over the next 10 years. This obviously implies the end of deflation and the restoration of steadily rising prices – a target which the government says it is determined to achieve within the short space of one year from now, without explaining exactly how it hopes to do so.
Some 120 trillion yen (S$1. 8 trillion) of additional demand (equivalent to around 20 per cent of current GDP) is supposed to be injected into Japan’s economy over the next 10 years by virtue of focusing on the seven ‘strategic sectors’, and some five million new jobs created. Such is the very general (and uncontroversial) nature of the growth strategy that few Japanese voters are likely to challenge it or demand more specific answers from the DPJ about how growth can be stimulated and at what cost to taxpayers.
Mr Kan would probably prefer not to answer such questions at present. Getting government back into business could be very costly, especially if this includes subsidising development of certain industries, and he is anxious to cultivate an austere image at present. Mr Kan’s insistence on giving priority to restoring fiscal soundness appears to go against the DPJ’s original mission to promote economic growth by means of subsidising personal consumption through generous child allowances, a commitment that has now been scaled back.
Without radical new approaches such as the DPJ appeared to offer on both supply and demand side, some economists fear Japan could continue to stagnate, slipping soon behind China as the world’s second largest economy and progressively behind other Asian nations too in terms of competitiveness. The lack of boldness that characterises the new growth strategy – including the absence of earlier-suggestions to use funds from Japan’s state-owned postal savings and insurance fund and from state pension schemes to fund industrial development – may be a political feint on Mr Kan’s part.
He may be trying to shore up relations between his party, which has strong backing from trades unions, and Japanese business lobbies – especially the federation of economic organisations (Keidanren) which argues that the private sector must take the lead in Japan’s economic revival, even though it has failed to do so up to now. Any strong emphasis on more dirigiste or interventionist government policies at this stage could cost the DPJ votes.
Likewise, Mr Kan’s decision to delay controversial legislation to scale back the privatisation of Japan’s postal empire – a cash cow that could be milked to help finance the government growth strategy – may be another political feint. If the DPJ can use such stratagems to reassure voters that it is not leading the country toward fiscal ruin and thereby capture enough seats in the July 11 upper house election to give it absolute control over both houses of Parliament, it will be in a position to give teeth to the growth strategy.
If not, the menu of offerings is unlikely to satisfy Japan’s growth needs. Economic Reforms Fail Kan’s new plans to raise sales tax in Japan will fail and create a situation even worse than it is in the status quo Nozawa 6-22 (Shigeki, reporter from Bloomberg Businessweek, “Japan’s Sales Tax Gain May Widen Deficit, Credit Suisse Says”, 6-22-2010, http://www. businessweek. com/news/2010-06-22/japan-s-sales-tax-gain-may-widen-deficit-credit-suisse-says. tml, 6-22-2010) TC Raising Japan’s sales tax prematurely would damp economic growth, push the nation deeper into deflation and widen its budget deficit, according to Credit Suisse Group AG. While Japan’s public debt is 180 percent of gross domestic product, it will be able to keep financing its budget deficit with domestic savings, said Hiromichi Shirakawa, chief Japan economist at Credit Suisse in Tokyo. Japan should maintain stimulus measures as there’s no need to rush fiscal reform, according to Shirakawa.
Prime Minister Naoto Kan “should prioritize the economic recovery,” Shirakawa said. “He may risk pushing Japan deeper into deflation if he rushes to raise the sales tax. ” Japan needs to create at least 1. 1 million to 1. 9 million jobs over the short term to ease the deflationary shock likely to be caused by the tax increase, according to Shirakawa. Kan said last week he will consider the opposition Liberal Democratic Party’s proposal to double the tax to 10 percent.
Yesterday he said it will probably take “at least two to three years” to raise the levy. Turn: Kan’s economic reforms will be a complete disaster for general public because of fewer corporate taxes, more pointless military spending, and an increased consumption tax rate that directly harms the poor and middle-class People’s World 6/22 (Reposted from Japan Press Service, 6/22/10, ” Japan’s new prime minister vows strong economy – but for whom? “, http://peoplesworld. rg/japan-s-new-prime-minister-vows-strong-economy-but-fo r-whom/) TM TOKYO – Prime Minister Kan Naoto in his first policy speech on June 13 stated that his new Cabinet will “bring about a ‘strong economy,’ ‘robust public finances’ and a ‘strong social security system’ in an integrated manner. ” We now see both Japan’s economy and national finances in a weak condition, and the general public has the earnest desire to have the government strengthen them.
In the economy, public finances and social security, the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party)-Komei governments kept giving out wrong “prescriptions,” which made conditions increasingly worse. What the new government should do now is, therefore, to provide new prescriptions and get rid of the cause of the disease that seriously damaged our country in these areas. ‘A third way’ In the policy speech, Kan emphasized he will pursue a “third way” that he said is different from the political direction of previous governments.
However, when he talks about a “strong economy,” “robust public finances” and a “strong social security,” it is only a higher consumption tax rate and lower corporate taxes that the Prime Minister is attempting to achieve. This clearly indicates that the new DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan)-led government will keep the same course as that the previous DPJ-led government and the former LDP-Komei governments took. In fact, while describing their “growth strategy” at a press conference on June 9, Naoshima Masayuki, minister of economy, trade and industry, said, “The corporate tax rate needs to be lowered about 15 percent.
To begin with, we will reduce it by five percent in the next fiscal year. ” Hosono Goshi, acting secretary general of the DPJ, on June 11 also announced the party will include “cutting corporate taxes” as one of its campaign promises for the upcoming House of Councilors election. In addition, Finance Minister Noda Yoshihiko on June 8 explained that the Prime Minister’s pledge for a “drastic reform of the country’s tax system” “will obviously be applied to the consumption tax. According to the policy speech, the government will pursue a growth strategy by curbing wasteful expenditures and stabilizing social services through a sound national finance resulting from tax system reform with the result of promising relief to those in need. This scenario, however, seems to be a “pie in the sky. ” On the Futenma base issue for the U. S. forces, the government will increase the huge enormous military budget to construct a large military base at Henoko in Nago City at the U. S. request instead of reducing the military budget.
Far from correcting excessive tax breaks for large corporations and the very rich, the government is planning a further tax cut for large corporations. The government is going to increase wasteful spending, and no sound finance and elimination of wastes are possible unless the military budget and tax cuts for large corporations and the rich are redressed. The substance of the DPJ “growth strategy” looks just like that of the Liberal Democratic-Komei government: increasing the gap between the extremely rich and the rest of society.
The pension system that the DPJ is proposing as part of social services reform is thinly disguised a mechanism to shift the cost of pension premiums borne by large corporations to the general public by increasing the consumption tax rate. The government is going to maintain the discriminatory medical service system for elderly people aged 75 and over for another three years, thus breaking the DPJ public promise to abolish the discriminatory system. What is worse, the government is going to lower the age of applicability to 65, thus expanding the scope of the system. It is the quickest way to increase social unrest, not relief.
On June 8, soon after the new DPJ leadership was established, Secretary General Edano Yukio and acting Secretary General Hosono Goshi paid a courtesy visit to the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren). Hosono stated that the DPJ is preparing a growth strategy in accordance with the demands of Nippon Keidanren. Party that can speak for people against business circles If “strong economy, national finance, and social services” mean a strong and reliable government representing the interests of business circles and large corporations, nothing good can be expected for the general public.
The DPJ government, just as the LDP-Komei government, gives priority to the interests of business circles and large corporations over the concerns of people’s living conditions. The key to defend people’s livelihoods and gain a sound economic recovery is installing a government that can stand up to the self-centered interests of the United States and the Japanese business circles. Economic Reforms Fail Empirically, Kan’s tax-centric reforms are likely to crumple the economy. Asia Times Online 6/22 (Christopher Johnson, author of Siamese Dreams,6/22/10, ” Kan confronts taxing challenge “, http://www. atimes. om/atimes/Japan/LF23Dh01. html) TM TOKYO – If you’re shopping in Tokyo for a new television to watch the football World Cup, would you still buy it if the sales tax was doubled to 10%, as many politicians want? Or how about 20%, as some Finance Ministry officials suggest, or 22%, as the advised last month, in order to pay down the swelling government debt? Amid growing calls for tax hikes, many citizens and economists in Japan are worrying that the introduction of new taxes, which has snuffed out economic recoveries in the past, could scare away consumers and erode the popularity of new Prime Minister Naoto Kan. It seems to me to be unwise to be raising taxes when there is still so much excess capacity in the economy, interest rates are already at zero, and the exchange rate is strong,” Richard Jerram, an economist at Macquarie Capital Securities in Tokyo, told Asia Times Online. “Japan does not face the same constraints as Greece, which suffers from being locked into the euro. ” A Kyodo news survey over the weekend found that a third of about 400 candidates running for the July 11 Upper House elections favor doubling the consumption tax to 10%, and the former long-time ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party, vows to make it its policy.
But only a third of the current rulers, the Democratic Party of Japan, said they supported the tax hike, while another third didn’t respond to the survey. While this suggests that party members are divided over tax hikes, Kan, who became premier on June 8, devoted most of his first speech in the Diet (parliament) to worrying about the country’s debt, which is more than twice annual gross domestic product, the highest-rated among industrialized nations. “We cannot sustain public that overly relies on issuing bonds,” Kan told the Diet. As we can see in the euro zone confusion that started from Greece, there is a risk of default if the growing public debt is neglected and if trust is lost in the bond market. ” Kan proposed setting up a panel to discuss fiscal reform “beyond the boundaries of ruling and opposition parties”, and some of his party members reportedly want their election manifesto to include pledges to raise the tax. On Monday, however, Kan indicated the government would not raise the sales tax “for at least two to three years”. Bloomberg news quoted overnment Toshiki Tomita as saying that Kan may have to raise taxes by as much as 7 trillion yen (US$76 billion) to fulfill pledges to cap bond sales and limit public spending. Yet many politicians will recall that the T-word has cursed leaders and the economy in the past. Noboru Takeshita had to resign as prime minister not long after introducing the shohizei 3% consumption tax in 1989, which some say burst Japan’s bubble. In 1994, prime minister Morihiro Hosokawa announced at a midnight press conference that he was going to hike the tax to 7% – but he dropped the plan the next day amid a backlash and was ousted a few months later.
In 1997, premier Ryutaro Hashimoto finally pushed the sales tax to 5% , but many critics blamed it for snuffing out a recovery. Since then, a distrustful public has balked at any government attempt to take more money from them, in light of corruption scandals and the mishandling of millions of pension records. During the 2005 election campaign, then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi told an interviewer that the election was an “inappropriate time” to talk about tax hikes, which he reportedly favored as part of his efforts to stream the fat off Japan’s bloated public and corporate sectors.
Koizumi resigned soon after winning the election, and proposals for tax hikes have been dead in the water, at least until resurfacing in the past few months. Economic Reforms Fail Japan’s economic state is on the brink of collapse and a tax increase may be unsuccessful and unpopular Ghosh 6-11(Palash R. Ghosh, writer for International Business Times, Japan’s Own Growing Debt Crisis, 6/11/10, http://www. ibtimes. com/articles/28207/20100611/debt. htm, 6-21-10, DS) Over the last 30 years, Japan’s real GDP has hovered around 2% per year. This growth rate is not high enough for them to grow their way out of their spending – the spending accumulates debt and the debt becomes a greater and greater percentage of their overall output,” said Timothy Courtney, chief investment officer at Burns Advisory Group in Oklahoma City. “Currently, Japan ranks second in estimated debt/GDP ratio at roughly 190% [the largest such figure among wealthy, industrialized nations], behind only Zimbabwe. Eventually there will be one of three outcomes: growth must accelerate to pay for spending, spending must be reduced, or debt must be defaulted on. Gerald Buetow, Jr. chief investment officer of Innealta Capital in Charlottesville, Va. opined that “what Mr. Kan said is basically true, but it’s nothing new. Japan has been playing an irresponsible fiscal game for at least the past 15 years. The amount of public debt has been absurdly high for too long. ” Buetow explains that Japan was able to sustain its enormous debt because there was high domestic demand for these instruments. “The Japanese investor is a big saver and highly disciplined,” he said. But now as those investors age and become retirees, they’re likely to become net-spenders. Plus, there is little new demand from foreign investors for Japanese debt because of the low yields they provide. Where is the new demand coming from? ” Indeed, Japan’s relatively high savings rate has allowed their debt to be purchased by domestic savers who have accepted relatively low interest rates. “This has kept their debt from exploding like it did in Greece, but the risk is still there,” Courtney noted. “Rates are low because economic growth is anemic.
If growth continues to be anemic, how can the country service its debt? It likely can’t without raising taxes, which will further stunt future growth. ” Thus, The Japanese face the urgency of restructuring their debt and finding new ways to generate revenue – one politically unpopular way, raising the sales tax, has already been hinted at by Mr. Kan. Japan’s problems are indeed daunting – but are their finances really as bad as Greece’s (prior to the IMF/EU bailout)? Probably not. For one thing, Japan enjoys a large trade surplus and it is a creditor nation.
The distressing sovereign debt crisis in Europe has apparently made governments around the world take a long, hard look at their own financial conditions, leading, perhaps, to some over-the-top doomsday comments from senior officials. Still, Japan needs to reduce spending and impose some kind of austerity program, whether they are welcomed by the populace or not. Otherwise, given their demographic issues, the nation may find itself in a kind of death spiral. *****AT: DUGONG***** Species Defense No Solvency – multiple alternate causalities Rosenzweig 01 (Michael L.
Rosenzweig, Department of Ecology & Evolutionary Biology, University of Arizona, 2001, PNAS, Volume 98, No. 10, May 8, p. 5404) Human pressure may greatly accelerate the relaxation process by increasing accidental extinction rates. Various human activities suggest this. We increasingly commingle evolutionarily separate provincial biotas, creating the New Pangaea and introducing native species to predatory and competitive threats from exotics (47). We rapidly transport novel diseases and parasites around the world. We simplify biotic temporal regimes (for example by limiting disturbances such as fire).
And we are warming the globe. The National Research Council (44) implicates exotic species or lack of adequate disturbance as the root cause in endangering a significant proportion of threatened U. S. species. But global warming may constitute the worst threat of all: by altering the basic abiotic conditions of reserves, it can destroy their ability to do much of their job. When the earth was covered with contiguous tracts of natural habitat, species could track such changes, moving to keep up with the shifts in location of their favored habitats and so avoiding extinction (48-50).
But today, with natural habitats restricted to patches of reserves, this is not possible. Meanwhile, we show little sign of abandoning the destruction of habitat that brings deterministic extinction to species. No Impact – ecosystems are sufficiently resilient to withstand the loss of one species Sedjo 2k (Roger A Sedjo, Sr. Fellow, Resources for the Future, 2000, Conserving Nature’s Biodiversity: insights from biology, ethics and economics, eds. Van Kooten, Bulte and Sinclair, p. 114
As a critical input into the existence of humans and of life on earth, biodiversity obviously has a very high value (at least to humans). But, as with other resource questions, including public goods, biodiversity is not an either/or question, but rather a question of “how much. ” Thus, we may argue as to how much biodiversity is desirable or is required for human life (threshold) and how much is desirable (insurance) and at what price, just as societies argue over the appropriate amount and cost of national defense.
As discussed by Simpson, the value of water is small even though it is essential to human life, while diamonds are inessential but valuable to humans. The reason has to do with relative abundance and scarcity, with market value pertaining to the marginal unit. This water-diamond paradox can be applied to biodiversity. Although biological diversity is essential, a single species has only limited value, since the global system will continue to function without that species. Similarly, the value of a piece of biodiversity (e. g. 10 ha of tropical forest) is small to negligible since its contribution to the functioning of the global biodiversity is negligible. The global ecosystem can function with “somewhat more” or “somewhat less” biodiversity, since there have been larger amounts in times past and some losses in recent times. Therefore, in the absence of evidence to indicate that small habitat losses threaten the functioning of the global life support system, the value of these marginal habitats is negligible. The “value question” is that of how valuable to the life support function are species at the margin.
While this, in principle, is an empirical question, in practice it is probably unknowable. However, thus far, biodiversity losses appear to have had little or no effect on the functioning of the earth’s life support system, presumably due to the resiliency of the system, which perhaps is due to the redundancy found in the system. Through most of its existence, earth has had far less biological diversity. Thus, as in the water-diamond paradox, the value of the marginal unit of biodiversity appears to be very small. *****DISADVANTAGE LINKS*****
Heg DA Links Okinawan marine bases are key to US power projection and Asian stability Kapoor 6/10/10 (Rajesh, The Strategic Relevance of Okinawa The Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis http://www. idsa. in/idsacomments/TheStrategicRelevanceofOkinawa_rkapoor_100610) The debate over the necessity of US troops and bases in Okinawa Prefecture has created several political ripples within Japan. However the Japanese government has always given preference to the US-Japan Security Alliance over domestic politics citing national security requirements.
The relocation of US bases and troops outside Okinawa could have dampened the future of the US-Japan Security Alliance, which remains indispensable for both the US and Japan. Notwithstanding popular sentiments, the Japanese government has agreed to a “mutually viable solution” – relocation of Futenma air base within Okinawa probably off the coast of Henoko, Nago City in Okinawa Prefecture. Why is Okinawa so important for the US? Why do Japanese governments place so much importance on the US-Japan security alliance, while the people-centric issues are put on the back burner?
In the post-Occupation period, US troops and military bases in Japan have been instrumental in ensuring peace and stability within Japan as well as in East Asia. The geo-strategic location of Okinawa makes it the preferred site for hosting US military bases both in terms of securing Japan as well as for US force projection in the Far East. Okinawa’s distance from the rest of Japan and from other countries of East Asia makes it an ideal location to host military bases and thus extend US military outreach considerably.
In the case of an eventuality, it is easier for the US marines, who act as first responders to exigencies, to take appropriate action well before the rest of Japan is affected. In addition, Japan cannot ignore the potential threat it faces from its nuclear neighbours including China, North Korea and Russia. The Russian and Chinese threats, as of now, can be ruled out. However, the North Korean threat is very much real and Japan has been building up its Ballistic Missile Defence system in collaboration with the US to cater for it. Okinawan basing is critical to US military capabilities in Asia